Preparing for Peace While Ready for War: Considering the Involvement of International Organizations in Ukraine’s WPS Agenda
This blog post offers an overview of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO), the United Nations’ (UN), the European Union’s (EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) priorities between 2014 and 2022 in supporting the implementation of Ukraine’s NAPs.
Time to read: 10 min
Well before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, international organizations (IOs) played a key role in the conceptualization and implementation of Ukraine’s Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. Since the beginning of the war in 2014, their role has evolved and diversified, but these actors continue to prioritize the security sector when promoting the agenda’s implementation. These developments have occurred in tandem with Ukraine releasing two National Action Plans (NAPs) in 2016 and 2020.
Informed by my research work for the Canada Research Chair (Tier II) on Gender, Security, and the Armed Forces, this blog post offers an overview of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO), the United Nations’ (UN), the European Union’s (EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) priorities between 2014 and 2022 in supporting the implementation of Ukraine’s NAPs.
While there has been some variation between these organizations, they have mostly worked collaboratively to develop the WPS agenda in the military and defence sectors. The Ukrainian government and civil society generally perceive the presence and involvement of these IOs as crucial for Ukraine to develop an increasingly close relationship with Europe and the West. It is also important to note the active roles that civil society organizations (CSOs) and grassroots feminist activists have played in promoting and pushing forward Ukraine’s NAPs. Their importance should not be overlooked. While much more can be discussed regarding the drivers of WPS in Ukraine, this post offers a descriptive primer on these IO’s varied initiatives in the country since 2014.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO was one of the main international initiators of Ukraine’s first NAP. Much of its work with Ukraine operates through the NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv in cooperation with the International Military Staff’s Committee on Gender Perspectives. Since 2014, several Science for Peace and Security (SPS) funded initiatives have promoted discussion of the WPS agenda. For instance, in September 2015, an SPS-funded workshop titled “The Role of Women and Gender Policies in Addressing the Military Conflict in Ukraine”focused the discussion on women’s roles in military and defence settings, with the explicit objective of providing guidance and support for Ukraine’s first NAP.
According to an article by Mila O’Sullivan, NATO’s Liaison Office has encountered resistance from lower-ranking military officials when encouraging female leadership in the military. In response, they have reworked the initiative to cater to higher-level military leadership, arguing that women’s participation in defence and law enforcement would benefit Ukraine’s defence capabilities and operational effectiveness. This line of logic is based on NATO’s own use of operational effectiveness in justifying the WPS agenda. There is also evidence that NATO was using Ukraine as a “learning opportunity”to learn how to pivot its WPS implementation away from Afghanistan and towards territorial defence in Eastern Europe.
United Nations
Another driver of Ukraine’s WPS agenda has been the UN (primarily UN Women), often working in collaboration with NATO. One instance of this occurred in 2017 when both organizations supportedthe Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Defence’s recruitment of gender advisors to implement the country’s first NAP at the oblast level. UN Women also supported the “Invisible Battalion” project that raised awareness surrounding Ukrainian women’s informal participation in combat roles.
More recently, in 2020, UN Women surveyed the public perception of gender-based violence (GBV) in the Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. This focus on GBV aligns with other IOs, such as the OSCE, which has prioritized the issue more than other pillars of WPS. It has also offered consultations and provided technical assistance in finalizing Ukraine’s second NAP in 2020. Since the escalation of Russia’s invasion in February 2022, UN Women has provided humanitarian assistance to local communities in Donetsk as part of a gender equality project funded by the government of Denmark. While their work has recently pivoted to a more humanitarian focus, it has previously had a narrower view of the WPS agenda that focused on defence and military-oriented considerations.
European Union
Unlike NATO and UN Women, the EU has been comparatively less involved in promoting and implementing Ukraine’s WPS agenda. While the EU has been present in Ukraine since December 2014 through the EU Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM), some have critiqued its limited gender work. Despite these factors, the EU plays an important role as a “strong, motivational force,” particularly in terms of encouraging Ukraine to reform its security sector.
EUAM’s work, until February 2022, focused on the sustainable reform of the civilian security sector, such as through training programs for law enforcement officials and rule of law institutions. They have also run and supported workshops on gender-based violence and resilience-building during crises. Concerning WPS, EUAM’s mandate explicitly states that it aims to implement the agenda and its associated resolutions. In 2021, EUAM supported the development of the Ukrainian National Human Rights Strategy and noted that it was working with the government to ratify the Istanbul Convention on gender-based and domestic violence, which has sincehappened. Some scholars have noted that the EU did not provide meaningful financial support to combat gender-based violence until the end of 2017.
More recently, in March and April 2022, EU member states issued new tasks to EUAM, and the mission now supports Ukrainian law enforcement in facilitating refugee flow and the reception of humanitarian aid.
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Until March 2022, the OSCE had a Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, following a request from the Ukrainian government in 2014. The unarmed civilian mission ended when Russia blocked the decision to extend its mandate and, a few months later, prevented the renewal of the OSCE’s Office of the Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine. Despite these obstacles, the OSCE continues to work in Ukraine on a smaller scale through a new donor-funded Support Programme for Ukraine (SPU), which member states voluntarily contribute to and Russia cannot veto.
Across these frameworks, the OSCE’s activities in Ukraine have also shifted. The Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) had thirteen monitoring officers acting as gender focal points (GFPs) in the field alongside two gender advisors (GENADs) and a senior gender advisor. Compared to other IOs, particularly NATO, the SMM’s gender agenda was delivered in a broader package under the OSCE’s politico-military, economic and environment, and human dimension pillars. Within this framework, the gender-oriented projects primarily focused on women’s economic empowerment and female IDP integration. Notably, the SMM was among the first IOs to report on survival sex among IDPs and other impoverished residents, particularly vulnerable populations including women and girls, LGBTQ+ people, and Roma. The OSCE also collaborated with other IOs, such as its work with UN Women, to assist in creating Ukraine’s first NAP.
Since Russia has forced the OSCE to shift to the donor-funded SPU initiative, its tasks have pivoted to address immediate challenges to Ukrainian civilians. As the initiative becomes fully operational, it will become clearer what its primary projects are.
Conclusion
Overall, these four IOs have played a pivotal role in supporting and guiding the Ukrainian government’s implementation of its WPS NAPs. While the roles of CSOs and other actors should not be overlooked, these IOs’ conceptions and priorities of WPS have had a significant impact, particularly on Ukraine’s security sector. They have successfully encouraged Ukraine’s defence sector to apply a gendered analysis and increase the recruitment of women, but their arguments have been tied to concepts of operational effectiveness.
While this post has offered an introduction to the topic, it is worthwhile to further consider the resulting consequences of NATO’s, the UN’s, the EU’s, and the OSCE’s involvement in Ukraine’s WPS agenda. Because of the realities of war, these organizations have encouraged a narrow and defence-oriented focus for Ukraine’s WPS agenda. Looking to a future post-conflict Ukraine, how could this affect the development of its WPS agenda, especially in cases where the priorities of IOs and other stakeholders, such as CSOs, may diverge?
Morgan is a fourth-year undergraduate student at Queen’s University, studying Politics, Philosophy and Economics. As a researcher at the Centre for International and Defence Policy, she has researched conflict prevention in the extractive industries, middle power defence strategy, and great power competition in the Arctic. This article stems from her work researching NATO’s implementation of the WPS agenda and her thesis on the evolution of Ukraine’s WPS National Action Plans. Morgan is also the Co-President of the Queen’s Chapter of Women in International Security. She can be found at @morganofox.